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Undermining of Press Freedoms and the Rule of Law: an 





“The past was erased, the erasure was forgotten, the lie became truth.”1 
 
1. Introductory remarks 
 
Whether domestically or on a cross-border basis, defamation law has long been 
weaponized by economic and political actors wishing to escape scrutiny.2  It was not 
till October 2017, however, that the extent of the implications for press freedom and 
the rule of law began to crystallise in public imagination.  In the days following the 
assassination of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia in Malta, the present author 
noted and exposed the manner in which jurisdictional rules had been deployed to 
suppress factual reporting by media entities, removing the entire online record of 
suspected transnational financial crime involving governmental actors and their 
business associates.3  Far from being an isolated incident in a single Member State, 
it transpired that these events were symptomatic of a broader malaise arising from 
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increasingly commonplace out-of-court practice of defamation law which was 
hitherto largely undocumented.4 
 
In particular, costs arising from the ability to sue journalists in jurisdictions having 
only a tenuous connection to a case, under laws which bear little relation to the facts, 
have a chilling effect on press freedom and functioning democracies.5  It is argued in 
this paper that, in the absence of reform of private international law of defamation, 
the ability of the European Union to function as a sui generis legal order is severely 
circumscribed. This is especially so given that the Union’s need for the 
supplementing of public enforcement functions by individuals bearing enforceable 
rights6  cannot be met in the absence of informed and active civic actors.  
 
It is submitted, therefore, that the Brussels Ia Regulation7 should be amended in 
order to ground jurisdiction in the courts of the place the defendant’s domicile in 
defamation cases.8  This would limit the ability of pursuers to price a legal defence 
beyond the means of the defendant (i.e. journalists and others). Amendment of 
jurisdictional rules should be supplemented by the introduction of predictable choice 
of law formulae in the Rome II Regulation,9 as well as consideration of the 
introduction of harmonising legislation which would dissuade vexatious litigious 
techniques within Member States and from outwith the Brussels/Lugano10 juridical 
space. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Part 2 provides factual background, highlighting 
the extent and effects of abuse of process, as well the institutional responses to date. 
 
4 See e.g. Stavely-O’Carroll (n 2) 267-270; Sofia Verza, ‘SLAPP: the background of Strategic Lawsuits Against 
Public Participation’, European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2019). Accessible at: 
https://www.ecpmf.eu/slapp-the-background-of-strategic-lawsuits-against-public-participation/; Gill Philips, 
‘How the free press worldwide is under threat’, The Guardian (28/05/2020). Accessible at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/may/28/how-the-free-press-worldwide-is-under-threat 
5 Verza (n 4). 
6 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue 
Administration ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. 
7 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) [2012] OJ 
L351/1 (hereinafter ‘Brussels Ia’). 
8 This paper focuses on the Brussels Ia Regulation, but much of the discussion is applicable mutatis mutandis to 
Lugano Convention 2007, which mirrors the provisions of the Brussels Ia Regulation in most relevant respects.  
9 European Parliament resolution of 10 May 2012 with recommendations to the Commission on the amendment 
of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) (2009/2170/INI)) 
2013/C 261 E/03. 
10 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 




Part 3 situates the private international law discussion in its constitutional context, 
noting the centrality of private enforcement to the functioning of the EU legal order, 
as well as pertinent fundamental rights concerns. Part 4 then analyses existing 
jurisdictional rules and recommends that the imbalance in favour of the pursuer be 
remedied. It is then argued in Part 5 that this is to be complemented by 
harmonisation of choice of law rules in the Rome II Regulation, while Part 6 notes 
the need for the introduction of anti-SLAPP directive to address matters falling 
outwith the scope of existing instruments. 
 
2. Factual Context 
 
On 16 October 2017, Daphne Caruana Galizia, a Maltese investigative journalist, 
was killed by a bomb placed under her car seat. In the immediate aftermath, 
journalists stood together to declare that they would not be silenced.  All the while, 
however, online reports of Caruana Galizia’s journalistic revelations concerning 
transnational financial crime were disappearing from every news portal in Malta.11  
It was not a bomb that induced the redaction and deletion of news reports, but the 
opportunities which private international law offered prospective pursuers. Private 
international law became a battleground for the very foundations of freedom of 
expression and the rule of law in a Member State of the European Union.12 The events 
in Malta were symptomatic of far-reaching challenges to press freedoms and the rule 
of law in other member states of the European Union, and by extension in the Union 
as a whole.13 
 
Caruana Galizia’s revelations were of transnational concern, but had yet to capture 
the attention of the global press. The subjects of her revelations intended that this 
would remain the case, particularly in a period in which they were using their Maltese 
business as an illicit springboard into other EU markets.14 Pilatus Bank, an entity 
established in Malta, had been embroiled in controversy concerning allegations of 
 
11 See Delia (n 3). 
12 Jurgen Balzan, ‘“Government should have sought advice to protect journalists” – lawyers’, The Shift News 
(10/04/2018). Accessible at: https://theshiftnews.com/2018/04/10/government-should-have-sought-advice-to-
protect-journalists-lawyers/ 
13 See Philips (n 4). 
14 See Luca Rainieri, ‘The Malta Connection: A Corrupting Island in a “Corrupting Sea”?’ (2019) The European 
Review of Organised Crime 10, 22-25; Jelter Meers, ‘UK Branch of Pilatus Bank Closed Down’ (26/04/2018) 





money laundering and failure to abide by due diligence obligations.15 The goings-on 
at Pilatus were widely reported in Malta since it was alleged that the bank had 
processed illicit transactions to and between several politically exposed persons 
connected to government flagship initiatives.16 The bank was established in Malta, 
under Maltese law, and, at the relevant time, operated almost exclusively in Malta, 
but targeted its business to international clients including numerous international 
politically exposed persons such as Azerbaijan’s presidential family.17 Caruana 
Galizia’s reports were published by Maltese newspapers, and directed towards a 
Maltese audience, albeit in a language and via a medium which rendered them 
accessible worldwide. 
 
Despite the overwhelmingly Maltese connecting factors, Pilatus Bank engaged a 
London law firm to threaten to bring legal action for defamation against every Maltese 
news site in the United Kingdom and the United States. Maltese defendants would 
have been rightly concerned by the possible actions in the United Kingdom due to 
the significant hurdles involved in contesting the jurisdiction of a court which might 
arguably have jurisdiction under the Brussels Ia Regulation.18 The Regulation affords 
the plaintiff in libel cases a choice of forum as between the defendant’s domicile and 
the place in which damages are alleged to have been incurred.19 At face value, 
therefore, it would appear that a court in the United Kingdom would have jurisdiction 
if it could be shown that the allegedly libellous report resulted in damages there,20 
as Pilatus Bank averred. The defendant could be drawn into costly litigation in order 
to contest the jurisdiction of a court, determine the law governing the dispute, and 
to defend a lawsuit, the loss of which would be ruinous to media entities of Maltese 
dimensions.21 
 
15 Pilatus Bank has since been shut down in view of serious money-laundering failings. See Case T-687/18 R 
Pilatus Bank v European Central Bank ECLI:EU:T:2019:28; Panicos Demetriades and Radosveta Vassileva, 
‘Money Laundering and Central Bank Governance in the European Union’ (2020) Journal of International 
Economic Law 1, 17-18. 
16 See e.g. Jacob Borg, ‘Separation deed raises questions on Schembri-Tonna “loan”’, Times of Malta 
(20/01/2019). Accessible at: https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20190120/local/separation-deed-
raises-questions-on-schembri-tonna-loan.699516  
17 Rainieri (n 14) 22-25; Juliette Garside and Stephanie Kirchgaessner, ‘Azeri ruling families linked to secret 
investments via Maltese bank’, The Guardian Newspaper (23/04/2018). Accessible at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/23/azerbaijan-ruling-families-linked-to-secret-investments-via-
maltese-bank 
18 Brussels Ia, Art 7(2). 
19 Brussels Ia, Arts 4 and 7(2). 
20 Case C-68/93 Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint International Ltd v Presse 
Alliance SA ECLI:EU:C:1995:61, para 33. 





The threat of legal action in the United Kingdom and United States was a strategic 
gambit which was motivated primarily by the cost of proceedings, as well as the 
psychological effects of a lack of familiarity with foreign law and procedure.22 London 
was by no means the appropriate forum, or indeed one which would be unequivocally 
empowered to exercise jurisdiction under the Brussels Ia Regulation as interpreted 
by the CJEU.23  Moreover, the bank’s substantive claims proved to be especially weak 
when later exposed to the scrutiny of financial regulators.24 As regards the 
threatened suits in the United States, First Amendment protections suggest that a 
successful defamation action for punitive damages would have been especially 
unlikely there given the apparent absence of actual malice.25 Nevertheless, the cost 
of litigation was enough to persuade the three independent Maltese newspapers of 
note,26 as well as at least one popular online portal, to delete or alter online content 
as requested by the bank.27 The media outlets invariably stood by the veracity of 
their published accounts of the facts, noting that the deletion and alteration was not 
an admission of guilt but a consequence of economic duress.28  In other words, the 
mere fact of the potential applicability of jurisdictional rules in the Brussels Ia 
Regulation and the absence of ex ante defensive mechanisms in respect of third 
states sufficed to undermine press freedoms enshrined in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.29  But for the steadfast resistance of Daphne Caruana Galizia, 
and the actions of online activists following her assassination, the alteration of the 
historical record would not have been known, and the altered record would have 
been the only remaining online account.30 
 
It is hardly surprising, of course, that journalists would submit, albeit reluctantly, 
to the demands of a pursuer rather than engaging in litigation which could cost 
 
22 Ibid. 
23 For analysis of relevant jurisdictional rules, see Section 3 below. 
24 See Demetriades and Vassileva (n 15) 17-18; Rainieri (n 14) 22-25. 
25 See e.g. New York Times v Sullivan 376, U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).  
26 These are the Times of Malta, Malta Today, and The Malta Independent. 
27 See e.g. Chris Peregin, ‘The Least We Can Do Six Months After Daphne Caruana Galizia Was Killed’ 
(16/04/2018) LovinMalta. Accessible at: https://lovinmalta.com/opinion/the-least-we-can-do-six-months-after-
daphne-caruana-galizia-was-killed/ 
28 See e.g. Editorial, ‘Pilatus Bank: Malta’s media freedom SLAPPed in the face’, The Malta Independent 
(17/12/2017). Accessible at: http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2017-12-17/newspaper-leader/TMIS-
Editorial-Pilatus-Bank-Malta-s-media-freedom-SLAPPed-in-the-face-6736182724  
29 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C-326/391. 




hundreds of thousands of pounds merely to settle a jurisdictional argument.31  
Indeed, the fact of limited incidence of transnational defamation litigation masks 
extensive out-of-court settlement of disputes in situations in which one might 
otherwise expect respondent journalists to hold their ground.32 Financial, 
psychological, and other barriers to defending a lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction are 
well documented in the private international law literature.33 What is more, game 
theory analysis of out-of-court settlement of a dispute, which incurs negligible direct 
costs when compared to expensive litigation, would weigh heavily in favour of the 
former given the limited rationally grounded incentives to incur the risk and 
opportunity cost of litigation.34 This is all the more so where the risk of reputational 
harm to a media entity which deletes content is limited given the fact of the deletion 
would be unknown to anyone other than the would-be litigants.35 
 
Notably, the Pilatus Bank affair was not an isolated incident. The editor of the Malta 
Today newspaper observed that it is commonplace for transnational businesses to 
use the threat of libel to force the deletion of factual reporting.36 He cites four separate 
incidents involving unrelated businesses in which his newspaper acquiesced in the 
demands of transnational business entities to delete reports, implicitly suggesting 
 
31 See e.g. the following family law cases: V v V [2011] EWHC 1190 (Fam) [61] “The overall bill to the family, 
now standing at £925,000, will no doubt top £1 million if next month’s hearing about the children goes ahead. It 
should be recalled that this level of expense has been incurred without a basis of jurisdiction having been 
established”; W Husband v W Wife [2010} EWHC 1843 (Fam): legal costs amounted to determine jurisdiction 
amounted to £120,000; JKN v KCN [2010] EWHC 843 (Fam), [7] the combined legal cost to determine 
jurisdiction amounted to £900,000 at the preliminary stage.  In civil and commercial matters, similar costs have 
been observed; e.g. in Kolden Holdings Ltd v Rodette Commerce Ltd and another [2008] EWCA Civ 10, the court 
lamented the expenditure of £400,000 on a spurious challenge to jurisdiction. For qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of the use (and abuse) of jurisdictional litigation as a negotiating technique, see Beaumont, Danov, 
Trimmings and Yüksel ‘Great Britain’ in Beaumont, Danov, Trimmings and Yüksel (eds) Cross-Border Litigation 
in Europe (Hart/Bloomsbury 2017) 84-85. 
32 See Diana Wallis, ‘Working Document on the amendment of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), Committee on Legal Affairs, European Parliament 
DT\820547EN.doc (23.06.2010) 4. 
33 See e.g. Louis Visscher ‘A Law and Economics View on Harmonisation of Procedural Law’ in Xandra E 
Kramer and CH van Rhee (eds) Civil Litigation in a Globalising World (Springer 2012) 82-84; Jean Albert et al 
Study on the Transparency of Costs of Civil Judicial Proceedings in the European Union (European Commission 
DG 2007). Accessible at https://e-justice.europa.eu/fileDownload.do?id=99bdd781-aa3d-49ed-b9ee-
beb7eb04e3ce (Accessed 03 March 2019); Adriani Dori and Vincent Richard ‘Litigation costs and procedural 
cultures – new avenues for research in procedural law’ in Burkhard Hess and Xandra E Kramer (eds) From 
Common Rules to Best Practices in European Civil Procedure (Nomos 2018) 303-352. 
34 On the application of game theory to civil disputes generally, see Albert et al (n 33) 299-300. 
35 Lawyers’ letters seen by the present author invariably include a headnote stating that the content of the letter is 
not for publication. It appears that media entities which acquiesce in the demand to alter content also accept the 
demand to refrain from publicising the fact of the alteration. 






that this was not due to the strength of the claim, but the force with which it was 
made.37 Another Maltese news site, which was established following the 
assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, noted a further example in which it was 
the only news organisation to refuse to delete or alter online content following threats 
from the concessionaire for Malta’s lucrative Citizenship by Investment programme.38 
 
Furthermore, the Maltese examples of disadvantageous out-of-court settlement are 
far from unique, save to the extent that the specific instances of the practice have 
been exposed.39 The geographic and economic scope of the problem is readily 
discernible with reference to similar abuse of defamation litigation and threats 
thereof in Croatia,40 Germany,41 Italy,42 Malta43 and the United Kingdom44 among 
others. It is especially noteworthy that cases in which defamation law has been 
deployed to suppress factual reporting often relate to matters of cross-border 
concern, whether for reasons relating to the operation of the single market, or more 
broadly to the political governance of the Union.45 
 
A. Public-Private agreements to circumvent the Regulation’s limited scope 
 
In addition to concerns regarding horizontal cases of abuse of defamation law, it is 
noteworthy that the law has on occasion been used as an instrument for the 
privatisation of government-driven suppression of investigative journalism where 
 
37 Ibid. 
38 Alice Taylor, ‘Lawsuits that cripple journalists: Malta a protagonist in debate on press freedoms’ (02/03/2019), 
The Shift News. Accessible at: https://theshiftnews.com/2019/03/02/lawsuits-that-cripple-journalists-malta-a-
protagonist-in-debate-on-press-freedom/  
39 NGOs report evidence of deletion and alteration of online reporting in several jurisdictions but have been unable 
to report specific instances due to confidentiality obligations. 
40 Giovanni Vale, ‘Croatia: over a thousand ongoing trials against journalists or media’ (23/01/2019) European 
Centre for Press and Media Freedom. Accessible at: https://www.ecpmf.eu/archive/news/threats/croatia-one-
thousand-lawsuits.html 
41 Sofia Verza, ‘SLAPP: the background of Stretegic Lawsuits Against Public Participation’. European Centre for 
Press and Media Freedom. Accessible at: https://www.ecpmf.eu/slapp-the-background-of-strategic-lawsuits-
against-public-participation/ 
42 Global Freedom of Expression, ‘SLAPPs’ 5 W’s: a background of the Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation (12/07/2018). Accessible at: https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/publications/slapps-
5-ws-background-strategic-lawsuits-public-participation/ 
43 Elaine Allaby, ‘After journalist’s murder, efforts to combat SLAPP in Europe’ (24/04/2019) Columbia 
Journalism Review. Accessible at:  https://www.cjr.org/analysis/slapp-daphne-caruana-galizia-malta.php 
44 Luke Harding on ‘Good Morning Scotland’, BBC Scotland, 23/06/2018. 
45 For an extensive overview of the geographic range and variety of SLAPPs in the EU, see Tarlach McGonagle 
et al, ‘The Safety of Journalists and the Fighting of Corruption in the EU’ (2020) Policy Department for Citizens’ 
Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, PE 655.187. Accessible at: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2020)655187; Greenpeace, 





members of government share interests with private sector actors. In May 2017, 
Daphne Caruana Galizia revealed that Henley and Partners, Malta’s concessionaire 
for its Citizenship by Investment programme, had planned to bring ruinous lawsuits 
against all of the independent Maltese press in agreement with Malta’s Prime 
Minister, his Chief of Staff, and the Minister for Justice and Culture.46 When quizzed 
on the matter in the European Parliament following the assassination of Mrs 
Caruana Galizia, Henley and Partners confirmed that the company regularly 
consulted governments before instructing lawyers to act against the press.47   
 
State actors are therefore able to use the Brussels Ia Regulation as a proxy for state 
censorship where a private party demonstrates willingness to front a potentially 
vexatious claim. This is problematic both in terms of its effects on freedom of 
expression, and from the perspective of the very private nature of private 
international law. The scope of the Brussels Ia Regulation is limited to private civil 
disputes, excluding state actors insofar as they act in a public capacity.48 The 
bringing of defamation cases which would benefit from the free movement of 
judgments runs counter to the limitation of the scope of the Regulation to civil and 
commercial matters, and counter to the spirit in which mutual recognition of 
judgments is acceptable to the Member States.49 It also has the potential to enable 
politicians to escape the higher standard of scrutiny which the ECHR reserves to 
political actors.50 It follows, therefore, that any analysis of the operation of rules 
which act as a counter-balance to freedom of expression should account also for the 
manner in which their practical operation may affect the very foundations of a 
democratic society as reflected in Article 2 TEU.51 
 
46 Daphne Caruana Galizia, ‘BREAKING/Prime Minister and chief of staff use @josephmuscat.com addresses to 
deal secretly with Henley & Partners chairman, who addresses them as “Keith and Joseph” (in that order)’ 
(31/05/2017) Running Commentary: Daphne Caruana Galizia’s Notebook. Accessible at: 
https://daphnecaruanagalizia.com/2017/05/prime-minister-chief-staff-use-josephmuscat-com-addresses-deal-
secretly-henley-partners-chairman-addresses-keith-joseph-order/ 
47 Caroline Muscat, ‘“The consequence for those who want to silence journalists must be public outrage’”, The 
Shift News (13/06/2018). Accessible at: https://theshiftnews.com/2018/06/13/the-consequence-for-those-who-
want-to-silence-journalists-must-be-public-outrage/. 
48 Brussels Ia (n 7), Art 1. 
49 See Brussels Ia (n 7), Recitals 10 and 26. 
50 See e.g. Castells v Spain App no 11798/85 (ECHR, 23 April 1992), para 46; Oberschlick v. Austria (no 2) App 
no 20834/92 (ECHR, 01/07/1997), para 29; Nedim Şenir v Turkey App no 38270/11 (8 July 2014) para 114; Pinto 
Pinheiro Marques v Portugal App no.26671/09 (ECHR, 22 January 2015), para 44. For academic analysis see 
Stephen JA Tierney, ‘Press freedom and public interest: the developing jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (1998) European Human Rights Law Review 419; Ian Cram, ‘Political Expression, Qualified 
Privilege and Investigative Journalism – An Analysis of Developments in English Defamation Law Post Reynolds 
v Times Newspapers’ (2005) Canterbury Law Review 143, 148-150. 





B. Institutional responses: an urgent need for reform 
 
In April 2018, a cross-party group of Members of the European Parliament called 
upon the European Commission to initiate the process for the adoption of anti-SLAPP 
legislation with a view to protecting journalists from vexatious litigation.52 In June 
2018, however, Vice President Timmermans responded to the MEPs arguing that the 
Union lacks competence to harmonise substantive defamation law, and strikes an 
appropriate balance in respect of private international law rules.53 Sustained 
research and advocacy efforts from MEPs and NGOs resulted in a somewhat different 
approach once Vice President Jourová took over the Values and Transparency 
portfolio in 2019.54 Jourová has since indicated that private international law of 
defamation merited targeted reform, and that the Rome II Regulation will be 
prioritised.55  It is argued hereunder that openness to reform is to be welcomed, but 
that it is paramount that legislative intervention addresses a broad spectrum of 
concerns regarding the operation of the private international law of defamation, 
particularly in respect of jurisdiction, as well as relevant domestic laws which abut 
on the private international law of defamation. 
 
3. Constitutional context 
 
To date, the development of EU private international law of defamation has lacked 
sustained engagement with the principled and legal constraints on the formulation 
and application of the law.  The Jenard Report concerning the Brussels Convention 
1968 notes that the articulation of EU rules on jurisdiction in tort was simply a 
reflection of the position as it persisted in the six founding Member States.56  There 
was little consideration for the manner in which tort should be addressed generally, 
 
52 David Casa, Ana Gomes, Monica Macovei, Maite Pagazaurtundúa, Selios Kouloglou and Benedek Javór, 
correspondence with Vice-President Timmermans, 11 April 2018. Accessible at: 
https://www.anagomes.eu/PublicDocs/88ffcc68-5169-4486-9614-105aab81d82a.pdf 
53 Frans Timmermans, correspondence with Members of the European Parliament (12/06/2018). Accessible at: 
https://www.anagomes.eu/PublicDocs/974f0440-6c8c-48e3-bee4-80e6ced9735e.pdf  
54 Vice-President-designate for Values and Transparency, ‘Answers to the European Parliament: Questionnaire to 
the Commissioner-Designate Věra Jourová’, 17-18 (Accessible at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/sites/comm-cwt2019/files/commissioner_ep_hearings/answers-
ep-questionnaire-jourova.pdf 
55 Parliamentary questions (22/06/2020), Answer given by Vice-President Jourová on behalf of the European 
Commission, Question reference E-002166/2020 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2020-
002166-ASW_EN.html 




still less how the practice of defamation law might be altered by the free movement 
of judgments in an internet age which had yet to dawn. Notably, Jenard states that 
the inclusion of special rules in respect of tort was necessary ‘especially in view of 
the high number of road accidents.’57 Clearly, the considerations which bore on the 
minds of the drafters of the 1968 Convention addressed mundane horizontal 
relationships – important to the parties, but of little systemic consequence for a legal 
order governed by the rule of law; a far cry from the constitutional problems arising 
in contemporary defamation cases.58   
 
The lack of engagement with principle in respect of jurisdiction is exacerbated by 
unsuccessful engagement in respect of choice of law problems. The Rome II 
Regulation excludes defamation altogether for lack of agreement among the Member 
States, thereby requiring litigants to discover and rely upon domestic choice of law 
rules.59  A decision to ground jurisdiction in a particular court or courts, therefore, 
also enables the pursuer to choose which substantive and procedural rules will apply 
to a dispute.60 The net effect is that, with little consideration for underlying 
principles, EU law has developed a strong pro-pursuer regime in the private 
international law of defamation. This section sets out to sketch the principles of 
which lawmakers should take cognisance with a view to remedying the law’s present 
shortcomings.  
 
A. Private Enforcement, and the Rule of Law 
 
Central to the EU legal order is the notion that both the state and the private sector 
exercise a role in the governance of contemporary life.61  The power of both is to be 
curtailed with a view to limiting concentration and abuse of public and private power, 
both whether exercised separately or in tandem.62 The salience of this post-war 
movement towards West German ordoliberalism is all the more accentuated in the 
 
57 Ibid 26 
58 On the complexity and distinctiveness of the private international law of the tort of defamation, see PB Carter, 
‘Defamation’ in Campbell McLachlan and Peter Nygh (eds) Transnational Tort Litigation: Jurisdictional 
Principles (OUP 1996), 107-108. 
59 See e.g. Alex Mills, ‘The law applicable to cross-border defamation on social media: whose law governs free 
speech in ‘Facebookistan’?’ (2015) Journal of Media Law, 1. 
60 Ibid, 4. 
61 Van Gend (n 6). 
62 For in-depth analysis of the influence of ordoliberalism in the development of a European economic 
constitution, see e.g. Laurent Warzoulet, ‘The EEC/EU as an Evolving Compromise between French Dirgism and 




context of contemporary economies in which public goods have been privatised, and 
public interest obligations transferred along with public assets to private actors.63  In 
legal terms, this is accompanied by the ‘blurring [of] the traditional distinctions 
between public and private law.’64 The recognition of quasi-equivalence between 
elements of the exercise of public and private power is especially evident in the 
treatment of private undertakings in competition law,65 but is also central to the 
horizontal effects of treaty provisions whereby individuals are empowered to exercise 
rights emanating from EU law, particularly its core constitutional principles, as 
against one another.66 The normative framework of the law requires democratic 
governance to curtail abuse of asymmetries of power, whether they involve the State 
or private actors alone.67 
 
Furthermore, the central tenet of the constitutionalisation of EU law is that citizens 
exercise an enforcement function, supplementing oversight by public entities. The 
seminal judgment in Van Gend turns on this very point.68 A functioning legal order 
requires not only the vigilance of public entities, but the supplementing of public 
enforcement functions by individuals bearing enforceable rights.69 EU law 
distinguishes itself from general international law on the basis of its amenability to 
private enforcement with a view to ensuring effectiveness, and the tools which the 
CJEU has fashioned (and which the Member States have embraced) to that end.70  
Equally, the Court has developed remedies such as state liability with a view to 
ensuring the effectiveness of private enforcement where horizontal rights are 
rendered unenforceable by Member State failings.71 Private enforcement, by the 
Court’s own account, is central to the distinction between EU law as a sui generis 




63 See Wolf Sauter and Harm Schepel, State and Market in European Union Law: The Public and Private Spheres 
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In the context of libel suits, therefore, it is self-evident that the ability of individuals 
to be informed of and to scrutinise the activities of powerful actors, whether they 
appear in the guise of the state or as private entities, enjoys an elevated status among 
the principles underpinning the EU legal order.  The Treaties do not merely establish 
an internal market, but also address the manner in which economic and political 
governance of that market are exercised. This includes the legal facilitation of 
scrutiny of the behaviour of individual entities by the institutions of the Union, the 
requirement that the Member States scrutinise those entities, and – crucially – the 
enforcement functions of informed individuals as market and civic actors.  In the 
absence of a system which safeguards public scrutiny, the very foundations of EU 
law as a distinct legal order are rendered unsound. 
 
B. Fundamental Rights 
 
Any legislative intervention concerning defamation must, of course, account for the 
potential conflict between a number of fundamental rights, including the right to 
freedom of expression, the right to privacy and the right to access to courts.  
Defamation litigation almost invariably involves consideration of the appropriate 
balance to be struck between the rights of one party to state facts or express 
opinions, and the other party’s right to safeguard their privacy or reputation.73  
Insofar as jurisdictional rules may result in the denial of access to courts, they could 
operate as a proxy for the denial of other fundamental rights of one party or the other.   
 
EU law and the ECHR do not, on the face of it, express a clear and systematic 
preference as between the prospective parties’ rights.74  This is to be distinguished 
from the position in the United States where First Amendment rights have long been 
upheld as ‘the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom’.75 It is 
beyond the scope of this paper, and perhaps impossible, to identify policy choices 
which would strike an unassailable balance between relevant rights in the European 
Union.  Suffice it to note at this juncture that, notwithstanding the European Court 
of Human Rights’ efforts to establish a sound balance in individual cases,76 the 
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manner in which legal practice operates – often outwith the courts – results in a 
factual state of affairs which is weighted heavily against freedom of expression. As 
noted in Part 2.A above, this is achieved through the exercise of coercive economic 
power which denies the respondent the right to access to courts.77 The reform of 
jurisdictional rules proposed hereunder is therefore intended to address existing 
imbalance without doing violence to the right of the claimant to have a case heard, 
while operating within the permissible margin of appreciation afforded to legislators 
in the present state of European fundamental rights law. 
 
4. Jurisdiction 
A. The general scheme of the Brussels I Regulation 
 
The Brussels Ia Regulation is designed to prevent forum shopping and to provide 
prospective litigants with predictable litigious processes and outcomes.78 In the 
absence of a choice of court agreement between the parties,79 this is achieved by 
grounding jurisdiction in the court which is most closely connected to the facts of 
the case. Usually, this is the court of the domicile of the defendant.80 The underlying 
reasoning is that a pursuer should not be empowered to use jurisdictional rules to 
exact an advantage over the respondent by shopping for a court which is convenient 
to themselves, or vexatious to the counter-party; jurisdictional rules should, in 
principle, produce neutral outcomes for the parties. 
 
In some cases, however, the Regulation recognises that there exist power 
asymmetries between the parties, or particular connections to a specific jurisdiction, 
which require a lawsuit to be heard in a court other than that of the defendant’s 
domicile, or which should afford the pursuer a choice as between the court of the 
defendant’s domicile and another connected court. This may be because of an 
overwhelming State interest or connection to a case, such as in respect of entries in 
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public registers,81 or because of strong factual connections to a particular 
jurisdiction which might render it more practically convenient to litigate there.82   
 
One such situation is tort, or delict in Scots law. The rules concerning jurisdiction 
in tort cases remain unchanged since the adoption of the Brussels Convention 1968, 
save to the extent that they have been subject to extensive elaboration and 
development by the Court of Justice of the European Union.83 In tort cases, the 
pursuer usually claims to be a victim of activity which could not be predicted, and 
for which they could not make ex ante legal arrangements for the settlement of 
disputes.84 The law is framed with reference to the involuntary nature of the 
obligations purportedly owed to the pursuer, and affords a unilateral choice of forum 
as between the jurisdiction which is most closely connected to the respondent, or the 
jurisdiction which is most closely connected to the facts of the case. Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels Ia Regulation therefore establishes a special ground of jurisdiction in 
addition to the general jurisdictional rule based on the defendant’s domicile. The 
pursuer may also bring an action in ‘the place where the harmful event occurred’.  
This is understood to mean either the place from which the harm originated, or the 
place in which the resulting harm was incurred.85 Accordingly, in a simple case of 
cross-border damage, the Regulation opens up the possibility of forum shopping as 
between up to three jurisdictions. As discussed in Part 4.B below, that choice is 
multiplied in cases of online defamation. 
 
While the motivation for the formulation of the rules on jurisdiction in tort appears 
to be the availability of evidence in the relevant jurisdictions,86 as opposed to an 
explicit reference to power asymmetries between the parties, in granting a unilateral 
choice of jurisdiction to the pursuer there can be no question that the legislator 
demonstrates a degree of sympathy to the party which claims to be an involuntary 
creditor. Furthermore, in applying a liberal interpretation to the term ‘the place 
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where the harmful event occurred’,87 the CJEU departs from the general principle of 
narrow interpretation of exceptions to the default rule of jurisdiction based on the 
domicile of the defendant. This suggests that the Court is especially sympathetic to 
the position of the purported victim, despite protestations to neutrality.88 Indeed, in 
Shevill the Court analyses the efficacy of jurisdictional rules entirely from the 
perspective of the plaintiff.89 
 
Generally, the adjustment of default rules of jurisdiction for tort cases is entirely 
sensible. Consider, for example, the facts in the Bier decision, in which the Court 
provided an authoritative interpretation of the term ‘the place where the harmful 
event occurred’.90  In this case, the operator of a French mine had polluted the Rhine 
river, and this pollution caused extensive damage to a flower nursery downstream in 
the Netherlands. In these circumstances, the pursuer had no juridical connection to 
the mine in France prior to the harmful event, save for the geographical accident of 
shared resources. Allowing the institution of an action in the Netherlands realigns 
the asymmetry of power as between the involuntary creditor and the tortfeasor. Nor 
is there any overwhelming connection which would militate in favour of preferring 
France to the Netherlands as a suitable forum in which to bring evidence before a 
court. While evidence of negligence or malfeasance is to be found in France, the 
existence and extent of damage can only be determined with reference to facts 
situated in the Netherlands. It follows, then, that the departure from the CJEU’s 
tradition of interpreting special grounds of jurisdiction narrowly is both sound in 
principle, and appears to be in keeping with the intentions of the legislator. 
 
In a cross-border libel suit, however, the situation is quite different. First, it must be 
recognised that the media is not ordinarily in the business of writing about the 
activities of people and entities which have no voluntary connection to the 
jurisdiction in which the newspaper’s target audience is situated. The alleged victim 
is usually a person who has chosen to engage in activity of public interest, often in 
numerous jurisdictions. Unlike the owner of a nursery in the Netherlands, who had 
no active interest in the activities of a French mine, the pursuer in a libel case usually 
knowingly engaged in activity which created a voluntary nexus between themselves 
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and the jurisdiction from which the alleged harm originated. Accordingly, while the 
allegedly defamatory act is not itself a product of the will of the pursuer, it remains 
the case that there is, conceivably, a degree of voluntariness which distinguishes the 
tort of defamation from other torts.  
 
It follows that the wholesale application of rules concerning ordinary torts to 
defamation is intrinsically problematic. As demonstrated in the next sub-section, the 
Court’s elaboration of special rules for online defamation serves only to exacerbate 
these difficulties, further underscoring the need for legislative reform. 
 
B. Case law of the CJEU in defamation cases 
 
The Court of Justice has, on a number of occasions, been faced with the difficulty of 
reconciling general rules concerning jurisdiction in tort with the specific problem of 
defamation.91 On a positive note, the Court has been mindful of the need to restrict 
forum shopping, particularly in cases of online defamation.92 In general, however, it 
appears that the EU judiciary has not been especially sensitive to two key problems 
in transnational litigation. First, case law lacks sustained consideration of the effects 
on freedom of expression and access to courts arising from the vexatious use of 
jurisdictional rules. Secondly, and partly as a consequence of a failure to engage in 
policy and human rights analysis specific to defamation, the Court appears to pursue 
the path established in Bier whereby development of jurisdictional rules is shaped 
by the involuntary nature of the legal relationship to which the purported victim is 
party.  This assumption is problematic when considered in the light of the extensive 
use of jurisdictional litigation designed to provide a negotiating advantage.93  In less 
sympathetic terms, jurisdictional rules are deployed as a means to extract agreement 
to terms which would not otherwise be acceptable to counterparties. When 
considered in the context of the right to free speech, as well as the rule of law 
implications of suppression of investigative journalism, it is immediately apparent 
that the Court’s analysis requires greater nuance which might enable a break with 
path dependency.  This has not been forthcoming. 
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The potential for mischief is borne out by the present author’s analysis of reported 
defamation cases in which the Brussels Ia Regulation was relied upon in the courts 
of England and Wales in 2018-19. It is clear from this analysis that the limited 
number of cases which are carried through to litigation corroborate the concerns 
regarding out-of-court settlement above.94  In Said v Groupe L’Express95 the 
respondent distributed a publication principally in France, in the French language, 
and concerning an accredited diplomat residing in Monaco, a regular traveller in 
France, and who owned a property in Paris. It was alleged that the pursuer had 
smuggled funds through France.96 L’Express had only 214 subscribers in the entire 
United Kingdom, including Scotland and Northern Ireland, and sold a further 
approximately 65 copies at retail outlets. Online readership in the UK was just 252 
according to L’Express.  This is to be contrasted with global readership of 300,000 
hard copies and 32,000 online. In sum, then, the connections to France are both 
extensive, and voluntary on both sides of the dispute. Connections to England and 
Wales, on the other hand, are limited. Similarly, in Euroeco Fuels (Poland) Ltd v 
Szczecin and Swinoujscie Seaports Authority SA, the claimant operated petrochemical 
production plant at a port in Poland through a company incorporated under Polish 
law.97 It is hardly beyond the realm of imagination that the activities of the company 
should be of interest to the Polish public. In this case, however, the High Court was 
required to find that it had jurisdiction under the Brussels Ia Regulation given that 
the pursuer’s centre of main interests was situated in the UK.98 
 
Limited as the sample of cases is, what it demonstrates is that the deployment of the 
jurisdictional rules in relation to defamation is somewhat gratuitous. In either case, 
it is clear that England and Wales is not the jurisdiction which is most closely 
connected to the facts of the case. In both cases, the pursuer had established 
voluntary connections of public interest with the jurisdiction in which the allegedly 
defamatory statements were made, thereby negating possible economic arguments 
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in support of adjustments for the party claiming to be an involuntary creditor.99 In 
the Polish case, the voluntary connection to Poland was potentially particularly 
profitable.  While it must be conceded that the respondents voluntarily disseminated 
content which was potentially accessible elsewhere, and which could cause harm 
elsewhere, it must equally be accepted that contemporary journalism and its 
consumption require online presence. 
 
Not only has the CJEU been unable to provide a nuanced body of case law which is 
mindful of freedom of expression concerns, but where online defamation-specific 
innovations have been forthcoming, these have often added to the potential 
respondent’s vulnerability to abuse of process. In Shevill, the Court reaffirmed that 
a pursuer could sue in every state in which a publication is distributed for the 
damages arising in that state.100  This is in keeping with the Bier principle that tort 
jurisdiction affords a choice as between the place from which the damage issued and 
the place in which the resulting damage was felt; in libel cases, this means a choice 
between the place in which the publisher operated, or the place (or places) in which 
the allegedly libellous material was distributed.   
 
While the total quantum of damages would not be multiplied by virtue of this ‘mosaic 
approach’ itself, the immediate problem for journalists is, of course, that this could 
expose the defendant to the costs of litigation in each of those states notwithstanding 
the fact that the pursuer could, in principle, sue for the entire claim in the state of 
the defendant’s jurisdiction.101 The scale of potential exposure to litigation is 
especially accentuated in the context of the ubiquitous accessibility of online 
reportage.102  
 
Equally, of course, the mosaic approach renders it difficult for a claimant to recover 
damages for the full extent of harm caused.103 It is this difficulty which prompted the 
Court to afford a further choice to the pursuer, namely to sue the defendant for the 
global damage caused in the state in which the pursuer has their centre of main 
interests.104 This is a sensible adjustment insofar as it enables the pursuer to avoid 
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multiplication of proceedings. However, the judicial innovation does not require the 
pursuer to concentrate litigation in one jurisdiction; it is facultative innovation which 
provides the pursuer with further unilateral choices of litigation strategy. Although 
the Court does demonstrate a degree of sympathy with the position of the respondent 
insofar as it affirms that jurisdiction in online defamation cases should not be 
universal in Svensk Handel,105 the net result of the judgments remains that the 
pursuer has an extensive choice of a litigation techniques. In the hands of an 
unscrupulous and well-financed party, this is certainly problematic in that the pre-
litigation stage places the prospective respondent at the mercy of lawful but 
potentially abusive tactics.106   
 
The availability of the mosaic approach could equally constitute a breach of the right 
to freedom of expression. In Ali Gürbüz v Turkey it was held that the initiation of 
multiple proceedings constituted a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR.107 The case of 
Gürbüz concerns criminal proceedings, and is therefore distinguishable from civil 
defamation suits which would fall within the scope of the Brussels Ia regime.  
Nevertheless, the reasoning of the ECtHR can be transposed readily to a situation in 
which a claimant brings multiple potentially ruinous proceedings in several states.  
While the respondent is not faced with potential deprivation of liberty, the 
opportunity cost of time and money invested in defending multiple suits has the 
same effect on the attractiveness of the exercise of free speech.108 The mischief of a 
freezing effect on freedom of expression therefore remains, and, it is submitted, 
equally constitutes an infringement of Article 10 ECHR.  
 
 
C. Need for legislative intervention 
 
Human rights defences to the operation of the jurisdictional rules in defamation 
cases remain an underexplored possible route for litigants. This is notwithstanding 
the fact that the Regulation has been deployed to undermine the right to access to 
courts, and by extension the right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed in the EU 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights.109 Nevertheless, conclusions concerning the viability 
of a human rights claim can be gleaned with reference to the CJEU’s broader 
inclination to reinforce the predictability, and therefore the rigidity, of the 
Brussels/Lugano system. As is evident with reference to judgments concerning the 
deployment of antisuit injunctions, the Court is reluctant to replace the ex ante 
general analysis deployed by the legislator with its, or a national court’s, judgement 
of the merits of jurisdictional justice in individual cases.110 This would, in the CJEU’s 
view, do violence to the general scheme of the Brussels Ia Regulation which is 
predicated on the notion that jurisdictional outcomes should be predictable, and that 
courts in different Member States are required to trust one another’s decisions as to 
the exercise of jurisdiction under the Regulation.111 It follows then that the litigant 
who wishes to contest the application of jurisdictional rules would face an uphill 
struggle should a reference ever be made on this basis.   
 
Of course, defences concerning human rights restrictions arising from the 
application of the Brussels Ia Regulation differ significantly from the rationale in 
Turner v Grovit insofar as mutual trust between courts is not at issue. The pleading 
would not be that a court which is properly seised under the Regulation is unsuited 
to determine whether it should exercise jurisdiction, but that the exercise of 
jurisdiction by that court as required by the Regulation would breach the 
fundamental right to access to courts. Crucially, however, the catch in this scenario 
is that the litigant who is able to argue the jurisdictional point and seek a reference 
to the Court of Justice cannot be a respondent who lacks the financial means to 
litigate. If the respondent has the means to litigate the human rights case in the 
court which would be appointed to hear a case under the Regulation, the 
hypothetical nature of a human rights claim might render a request for a preliminary 
rule unnecessary or inadmissible.112 
 
An alternative route might be for the defendant to challenge the lawfulness of the 
Brussels Ia Regulation in the courts of their domicile. This approach has more 
promise insofar as affordability is concerned, but the procedural route to seise a 
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court of a live human rights concern, as opposed to a merely hypothetical threat, is 
also shut off by virtue of the principle in Turner v Grovit and the overarching lis alibi 
pendens rule in the Regulation.113 
 
It follows, then, that while there is a theoretical argument that the CJEU could soften 
the harder edges of the application of the Regulation, the opportunity is highly 
unlikely to present itself. Furthermore, if the opportunity did in fact arise, it is 
unlikely that the Court would be willing to break with the path it has established in 
its earlier case law.114 Accordingly, it must be for the legislator to loosen the bonds 
created by the Regulation, or to reorder the rules with a view to grounding 
jurisdiction in a court which is in fact closely connected to the dispute. Furthermore, 
it is submitted that a clear rule is required which would eliminate the opportunity 
for pursuers vexatiously to seise a court of litigation intended only to create a 
jurisdictional dispute. 
 
This would be best achieved by restricting jurisdiction in defamation cases to the 
Brussels/Lugano regimes’ default rules, namely the grounding of jurisdiction in the 
court of the defendant’s domicile in defamation cases, unless the parties agree 
otherwise.  In view of the fact that the default rule of jurisdiction grounds jurisdiction 
in the courts of the place of the respondent’s domicile, there does not appear to be 
any obvious argument that granting that court jurisdiction in defamation cases 
would infringe the claimant’s right to access to courts. Nor is there any obvious 
systemic reason to expect the availability of evidence to be limited as a consequence 
of constraint of pursuer choice. In contrast, the threat to freedom of expression posed 
by the permanence of existing rules is amply evident with reference to contemporary 
legal practice. 
 
5. Choice of Law  
 
The susceptibility of defamation cases to forum shopping is exacerbated by a lack of 
harmonisation of choice of law rules, and the significant variance in the substance 
of national laws.  In view of the exclusion of defamation from the scope of the Rome 
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II Regulation,115 a choice of court carries with it a choice of the standards of free 
speech to be applied to a particular case. As noted in Part 4 above, the pursuer is 
afforded extensive jurisdictional choice. This carries with it a unilateral right to 
determine not only the private law rights and duties of the parties, but also the 
fundamental rights standards and public policy applicable to a dispute. The practical 
effect is that journalists who engage in reporting of matters of cross-border interest 
must foresee and apply the lowest common denominator of free speech if they are to 
satisfy the standards of each legal system to which they may be subject.116  
Alternatively, of course, journalists might simply refrain from investigating and 
reporting cross-border matters for fear of legal reprisal. This chilling effect is 
especially problematic in the context of a European Union which seeks to develop 
the connectedness of a European polity in an EU democracy.117 It is therefore argued 
in this section that legislative intervention in choice of law is required to supplement 
reform of jurisdictional rules. 
 
Defamation was excluded from Rome II as a consequence of disagreement between 
the Member States, and between the EU’s legislative institutions. Proposals ranged 
from the Commission’s choice of the law of the habitual residence of the person 
harmed, to Parliament’s proposal which would have favoured the publisher’s 
establishment.118 In the Council of Minister’s deliberations, it is reported that some 
thirteen different options were put forward for consideration.119 In the event, the 
differences could not be bridged and a decision was taken to proceed with the 
adoption of a choice of law regulation which excluded defamation from its scope, 
provided that a review would take place by 2012. That decision in 2006 was 
perpetuated following further failure to agree to changes in 2012 and thereafter. The 
danger now is that the temporary exclusion of defamation becomes permanent.   
 
A lack of harmonisation of choice of law rules is especially problematic given the 
room for forum shopping available to the plaintiff. This is particularly true where the 
mosaic approach is chosen, but also in the event of a single jurisdiction being seised 
 
115 Rome II Regulation (n 9), Art 1(g). 
116 Mills (n 59) 19. 
117 See e.g. Joseph Weiler, ‘The European Union belongs to its citizens: three immodest proposals’ 
(1997) European Law Review, 150-156. 
118 Wallis (n 32) 2-3. 
119 Andrew Dickinson, ‘Privacy and Personality Rights in the Rome II Regime – Not Again?’, conflictoflaws.net 





of the entire claim. The judgment in eDate Advertising affirms that the courts of the 
place of the defendant’s domicile and of the place where the harmful event occurred 
are entitled to hear the entire claim in an alleged multi-jurisdictional libel.120 It does 
not follow, however, that that court will apply the law of a single legal system, still 
less its own law, to the entire claim. Thus, while the rule in eDate Advertising enable 
litigants to eliminate the costs of multi-jurisdictional litigation, it does not necessarily 
also eliminate the costs of engagement with multiple legal systems. By way of 
example, a court in France might be entitled to hear the entire claim concerning an 
alleged libel of a multinational entity having its centre of interests in France. 
However, the court might find that the part of the claim which concerns damages 
arising in France would be subject to French law, whereas damages arising elsewhere 
are to be determined in accordance with the relevant foreign laws.121 The court would 
then be required to hear experts from each of the relevant legal systems, thereby 
further multiplying litigation costs.122 
 
The difficulties are exacerbated by the complexity and multiplicity of systems for the 
determination of the governing law of tort. In the legal systems of the United 
Kingdom, for example, the double actionability rule operates as substantive 
protection for the respondent in defamation cases.123 However, it requires the court 
to engage in an inquiry of both the actionability of the claim in the forum, and in the 
place in which the harmful event occurred.124 In a multi-jurisdictional claim, this 
means that litigators must incur the cost of engagement with each relevant legal 
system.125 
 
The European Parliament’s proposal for the introduction of a choice of law rule for 
defamation in a recast of the Rome II Regulation is, therefore, certainly to be 
commended.126 Indeed, Mills argues persuasively that the formulation proposed by 
the Parliament is a sound place to start discussions for future reform.127 The 
Parliamentary proposal begins with a presumption that the applicable law will be the 
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law of the place in which the most significant elements of the loss are situated (para 
1).  This is subject to the exception, however, that the law of the defendant’s habitual 
residence will apply if it was not reasonably foreseeable that damages would occur 
elsewhere (para 2). There are then safeguards for printed matter and broadcasts 
whereby it is presumed that the place in which the damage occurred is the place of 
editorial control or the place to which a publication is directed (para 3).128 
 
While the European Parliament’s proposal has the merit of addressing conflicting 
concerns in defamation law,129 it is submitted that, for reasons of cost cited above, a 
rule which is more readily applied by courts and foreseeable to the parties would be 
preferable. To this end, a presumption that the law of the place to which a publication 
is directed would be applied certainly has merit. In the event that there is no such 
place, a supplementary rule would be required. In these circumstances a case could 
be made for the application of the default rule as proposed in paragraph 1 of the 
Parliamentary proposal, namely that the law of the place in which the damage 
occurred would apply.130 In any event, the key concern is to ensure a degree of 
predictability which would eliminate substantive advantages of forum shopping 
which would accrue to pursuers. 
 
6. Harmonisation of substantive and procedural laws 
 
The problems of jurisdiction and choice of law are exacerbated by a lack of 
harmonisation of defamation laws, and lack of pan-EU defensive mechanisms 
against the threat of litigation in third countries.  It is uncontroversial that divergence 
in national laws operates as both a financial and psychological barrier to 
transnational litigation, particularly when viewed from the perspective of the 
respondent.131 The party that is unfamiliar with the legal system which will determine 
the outcome of the case – usually the defendant - will, in their consideration of the 
potential outcomes, incur the further cost of risk arising from uncertainty of the 
law.132   
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Furthermore, substantive and procedural laws which lack tools to dissuade 
vexatious defamation suits are said to have a chilling effect on investigative 
journalism, whether there exists a cross-border element or otherwise.133  This is true 
whether the threatened lawsuit is framed in substance with reference to defamation 
law or other potential claims such as intellectual property law or privacy.134 The 
availability of procedural mechanisms to dissuade the bringing of vexatious lawsuits 
in matters of public interest merits further attention,135 as do procedural safeguards 
and court expertise which affect findings as to the existence of a legal breach.136 By 
way of example, anti-SLAPP statutes in the United States typically include the 
following procedural safeguards: 
 
(1) granting defendants specific avenues for filing motions to dismiss 
or strike early in the litigation process; (2) requiring the expedited 
hearing of these motions, coupled with a stay or limitation of 
discovery until after they're heard; (3) requiring the plaintiff to 
produce evidence that shows the case has merit; and (4) imposing 
cost-shifting sanctions that award attorney's fees and other costs 
when the plaintiff is unable to carry his burden.137 
 
Furthermore, the absence of specialised courts and use of juries in defamation 
proceedings in some jurisdictions limits the practical availability of sophisticated 
defences such as good faith and honest comment defences.138  Equally, rules in some 
jurisdictions concerning the burden of proof in the context of investigative journalism 
which relies on whistleblowers pose insurmountable barriers to a legal defence.139  
Investigative journalism is also hampered by a lack of harmonised defensive 
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mechanisms in respect of the enforcement of judgments of the courts of third 
countries.140 As in the State of New York’s Libel Terrorism Protection Act, 
consideration could also be given to the granting of relief to counter proceedings 
instituted outwith the European Union in respect of defendants amenable to the 
jurisdiction of courts of the Member States.141  It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
articulate the precise content of a possible anti-SLAPP directive. Suffice it to note 
here that a range of measures is required to ensure a level playing field for 
investigative journalism.  
 
The European Union lacks specific competence to adopt substantive and procedural 
legislation concerning defamation, save to the extent that procedure includes rules 
of private international law. While Article 81(2) TFEU provides a legal basis for the 
adoption of rules on civil procedure to eliminate ‘obstacles to the proper functioning 
of civil proceedings’, this is to be understood primarily with reference to the free 
movement of judgments.142 To date, the view has been taken that the Union therefore 
may not adopt legislation to harmonise national defamation laws or the finer detail 
of procedural law.143 The understanding of the manner in which competences are 
conferred on the Union has evolved, however. In particular, the Whistleblower 
Protection Directive,144 while restricted to illegalities falling within the scope of EU 
law, provides a robust precedent for the view that, read together, several articles of 
the TFEU confer competence in respect of defamation and procedure affecting public 
participation. The Commission identified no fewer than seventeen legal bases for the 
introduction of the directive in its original proposal.145  Taken globally, however, there 
is a clear thread running through the arguments which relies on the internal market 
effects of whistleblower protection. It is simply untenable to argue that 
whistleblowers should be able to turn to journalists as a matter of EU law, while the 
activities of journalists themselves do not fall within the scope of EU law save to the 
extent that the courts which may hear a case are determined by the Brussels Ia 
Regulation.   
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Furthermore, if it can be argued that whistleblower protection has a direct effect on 
the functioning of the internal market,146 it must follow that this is also the case for 
defamation. Indeed, as noted in Part 2 above, the effectiveness of EU law is reliant 
on the vigilance of individuals minded of their rights and apprised of relevant facts.147 
Those individuals include the journalists who inform citizens, and the citizens who 
are reliant on journalistic revelations. In this context, it is pertinent, perhaps, to 
recall breaches of EU law which have recently been exposed by investigative 
journalists, and which consequently enabled the Union to take action to rectify 
breaches of the law.148 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that EU law requires extensive reform to 
ensure that vexatious litigious techniques no longer have the effect of undermining 
freedom of expression in the Member States.  This is an especially pressing concern 
in the context of a Union which is currently facing unprecedented challenges to the 
rule of law and democracy. Reforms which recognise the central role of the press in 
safeguarding the rule of law would constitute a meaningful contribution to the 
advancement of democratic values where so much else has failed.  
 
It is submitted, therefore, that the relationship between the rights of pursuers and 
defendants in defamation cases should be revisited to remedy existing imbalance.  
Jurisdiction should be grounded in the forum of the defendant’s domicile unless the 
parties agree otherwise. This would enable the press to foresee where they will be 
expected to defend their stories, and would be in keeping with the core values of the 
Brussels Ia Regulation, namely predictability and the limitation of forum shopping. 
Furthermore, greater predictability as to the outcomes of choice of law processes and 
the content of national law are also needed in order to dissuade meritless litigation 
intended to suppress speech.  
 
Each of the above reforms is necessary if repetition of the events which preceded, 
and perhaps enabled, the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia is to be avoided. 
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The net effect would be to provide journalists with a robust system of protection from 
the sort of litigious techniques which chill freedom of expression, and which isolate 
and endanger the few who resist overwhelming odds posed by the unscrupulous 
abuse of tools which remain readily available to prospective litigants. 
